When the European Court of Auditors set out to gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU’s return policy, it was effectively auditing, for the first time, the weakest point of European migration policy.
Every year since 2008, about half a million non-EU citizens have been ordered to leave the EU because they had entered it, or were staying in it, without any authorisation.
However, fewer than one in five actually return to their own countries outside Europe.
In an earlier special report on migration management, we had identified eight reasons and factors for poor returns within the context of an audit of the arrangements for asylum and relocation of migrants.
In this particular audit, we decided to probe one particular area deeply: the level of cooperation with non-EU countries in the return of irregular migrants.
Since figures could fluctuate between one year and another and between one member state and another, we decided to approach the whole problem holistically.
We set out to assess whether the suite of measures that the European Commission took after the 2015 migration crisis has improved cooperation with priority third countries or not.
We distinguished between legally-binding readmission agreements with third countries and informal agreements.
Not surprisingly, we found that bilateral informal agreements yielded more effective results. This was because they offered far more room for flexibility at a time when third countries may be reluctant to engage in formal negotiations, mainly due to internal political considerations since these agreements can be a source of public hostility.
We also probed the negotiating process of EU readmission agreements and arrangements, how priority countries were identified, the commission’s support and incentives to third countries to improve cooperation and the sharing of best practices.
We focused on readmission cooperation with the 10 countries of origin that have the highest numbers of non-returned irregular migrants, excluding Syria.
We also assessed the performance of 20 EU projects linked to the readmission and reintegration of irregular migrants in these countries.
As set out in our special report, we found that the EU’s cooperation with non-EU countries has not been efficient in ensuring that migrants illegally present on EU territory return to their own countries.
While the EU did formally engage in dialogue and did launch negotiations with the countries with the most non-returned irregular migrants, we noted that the results for the 2015-2020 period were rather limited.
We found it totally unacceptable that, in spite of a migration crisis that dates back some six years, a coherent EU migration policy remains conspicuous by its absence- Leo Brincat
Negotiations of EU readmission agreements (EURAs) are often jeopardised by persistent sticking points, such as the mandatory inclusion of the ‘third country national’ clause which is often opposed by non-EU countries.
While some member states advocated using a carrot approach, others favoured the stick. Although we found that the use of sanctions or punitive measures did not often work, since they often have the effect of encouraging illegal immigration into the EU, we felt it would be optimal to develop a toolkit that mixed all components together, without excluding altogether an element of negative incentives.
What struck us most was the lack of synergy between the EU member states and the different European policies. The commission itself was often found lacking for not systematically involving member states in the process of negotiating readmission agreements.
We also noted the insufficient progress regarding measures to encourage third countries to fulfil their readmission obligations.
We made four forward-looking and constructive recommendations to the commission: a more flexible position when negotiating readmission agreements; better intra-EU synergies; the development of positive incentives for third countries; and the improvement of data collection.
We found it a matter of deep concern that we came across so much difficulty in obtaining homogeneous and comparable statistics and data from the EU27.
This does not mean that the report is all negative, as suggested by the title itself: ‘EU readmission cooperation with third countries: relevant actions yielded limited results’.
We were pleased to note that the commission and the European External Action Service both accepted our recommendations. It gave us equal satisfaction that, in her State of the Union address a few days ago, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen spoke clearly about very slow and insufficient results achieved so far in the migration-policy sector.
On mapping the way ahead, we hope that our audit will feed into the debate on the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum because an effective and well-managed policy is an essential part of a comprehensive migration policy.
It is not for us to define what this pact should actually consist of, since we are not policymakers. Nevertheless, we found it totally unacceptable that, in spite of a migration crisis that dates back some six years, a coherent EU migration policy remains conspicuous by its absence, with practically all member states adopting the migration policy of their own choice.
To delay further will not only risk having the EU miss an important opportunity to put its own house in order but, if matters escalate, particularly as a result of the recent developments in Afghanistan and Belarus, the EU could unwittingly find itself facing an existential crisis it can easily address through collective political will.