Russia’s new gas offensive against Europe

DISCLAIMER: All opinions in this column reflect the views of the author(s), not of Euractiv Media network.

Three-quarters of the gas transmission capacities from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea have been damaged. [Shutterstock/Kodda]

There are a few plausible scenarios for the coming winter, as Russia’s final conquest of Europe and Ukraine continues, attempting to any visible victory for the survival of the little dictator, writes Andrii Chubyk.

Andrii Chubyk is a senior fellow at GLOBSEC’s Ukrainian Programme.

On 26 September, three of the four Russian Nord Stream I and II pipelines were damaged, causing gas leaks into the Baltic Sea.

The following day, Björn Lund, a seismologist at the Swedish National Seismic Network at Uppsala University, rejected the possibility of earthquakes or landslides as the cause and confirmed the explosive nature of the leaks.

On 28 September, Gazprom threatened Naftogaz of Ukraine with sanctions, stating that the latter had initiated arbitration proceedings accusing Gazprom of breaking a take-or-pay clause in the gas transit contract signed in December 2019.

The European Commission has expressed deep concerns and promised to support any investigation to obtain the truth about what happened and why. Denmark, Sweden, and Germany have also started investigating these cases.

Three-quarters of the gas transmission capacities from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea have been damaged. Yet, the only string of Nord Stream II left accidentally operational is the one connected to the Russian Slavyanskaya gas compression station near Narva Bay with working units. Despite imposed sanctions, Russia still expects this string to be used by an EU Member State that would face a gas shortage during the upcoming heating period.

While no cubic meter of gas has been physically lost on the market, the leaks at both Nord Streams have impacted European gas prices. So far, it is the first and only short-term victory of Putin’s beloved so-called multimovement.

On 7 September, Putin warned Europe; if price caps on Russian energy sources are introduced, Russia will stop energy exports entirely, namely no more gas, oil, coal, and heating oil. With this in mind, it is worth analysing several directions of Russia’s approach against Europe using energy weapons.

Baltic or Northern Attack

Nord Stream I’s broken Baltic gas strings are a very suitable precondition for Russia to call for force majeure while simultaneously leaving the EU with only one option of taking the remaining single string of Nord Steam II into operation. This would counter Western sanctions, and Putin could claim absolute “victory” for his population. Respective media notifications to European decision-makers are already made.

Western authorities expect threats to other gas transportation infrastructure in the Baltic and Nord Seas, and investigations at the site will soon reveal the instrument used to damage the pipelines.

There are reportedly two options – an internal blast or an external explosion.

The internal blast could only have happened due to a deliberate Russian act, specifically by sending a special technical unit designed to detect internal pipeline damage. It could, however, also bring an exploding unit and blast it at a certain string area.

If an external explosion had occurred, it could have been caused by a regular or unmanned submarine.

In the latter case, further damage to European gas infrastructure is highly possible if the EU and NATO do not substantially strengthen the monitoring of areas around main gas pipelines, electricity cables, and Internet connections.

A Central European attack

Gazprom’s sanction threat should be perceived as launching a second gas attack against Europe, coordinated with Russian authorities.

Russia could use this opportunity to formally deploy full force majeure on the Ukrainian transit route, accusing Ukraine of so-called unfriendly actions.

After potential sanctions were introduced by Russian authorities, Gazprom could stop its monthly advancement payments and force the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine to deny providing further gas transit services.

The absence of Russian gas transportation to Central Europe will immediately affect gas balance in the region and require the redirection of flows, leading to eventual local gas shortages and further price spikes.

For Ukraine, it implies that the threat of missile attacks on energy infrastructure, damaging critical pieces before the heating season and causing considerable social unrest and further migration to the EU, continues to grow.

Southern or Black Sea attack

Turkish Stream operates two strings, one in Turkey’s direction and another sourcing Serbia and Hungary, two crucial European Russian allies, which are doing their best to play against Europe’s united position and solidarity.

Turkish confidence in stable Russian gas supplies is a case of arrogance, as the Kremlin has vital interests in enforcing Turkish suppleness to allow military ships from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea.

Furthermore, winter gas shortages could be a key argument for Turkey to accept Russia’s request.

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