Products of Australia: The International Consequences of Australia’s Deportation Policy

Criminal deportations were recently thrown into the spotlight in Australia, again. While detailed discussions about deportation provide an arena for domestic political point-scoring, we should also understand how our international relations with the places that receive Australia’s deportated criminals are affected.

Border security is a sovereign power, with deportation providing one way for states to manage non-citizens who criminally offend. Every state has different thresholds for deportation. Under s501 of the Migration Act [1958], Australia deports people who have served a cumulative sentence of over 12-months, or are of poor character—for example, associated with a gang but may not have committed a criminal offence.

The debate in Australia currently is about striking a careful balance between the safety of the community, and the family and community ties that an individual holds in Australia. Many people facing deportation have been here most of their lives, and, as would be expected, have families, children, and grandchildren residing in Australia. Immigration Minister Andrew Giles recently revoked Ministerial Directive 99, which directed decision-makers (Home Affairs officials and Administrative Appeals Tribunal members) to make family and community ties a primary consideration (while still considering community safety). In its place, Giles implemented Ministerial Directive 110, which instead lists community safety as the “highest” priority. S501 deportations have already increased with the change to Directive 110.

Directive 99 was established in 2022 after Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met with then-Prime Minister of New Zealand Jacinda Ardern and promised to address the “significant issue” of deportations to New Zealand. New Zealand has been concerned about Australia’s deportation practices since significant changes to s501 were made in 2014. At the time, Prime Minister John Key raised deportations as a central issue with Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, describing the policy as a “little bit like the Australians saying, ‘well, we’re going to pick and choose, we’re going to keep the ones we like but we’re going to send back the ones we don’t like.’”

Tensions between the two allied countries reached a peak in 2020 when Ardern visited Australia to speak with Prime Minister Scott Morrison about deportations, which she asserted were having a “corrosive effect on the relationship.” Ardern requested that Australia “Send back Kiwis, genuine Kiwis – do not deport your people, and your problems.” She agreed that if they had grown up in New Zealand, they were New Zealanders and could fairly be deported, but those that had left New Zealand for Australia as children were ostensibly Australian, as they were “too young to become patched gang members. Too young to be organised criminals. We will own our people. We ask that Australia stop exporting theirs.” Morrison refused to budge on the issue.

New Zealand disproportionately suffers from the consequences of Australia’s criminal deportation policy, receiving over 3000 criminal deportations since the 2014 amendments. In 2015, for instance, Gang presence and violent crime escalated, and New Zealand Police raised fears of “deportee overload.” Much of the re-offending on their return to New Zealand is attributable to a “silent sentence”: the upheaval deported people feel upon arriving in a country that, while they are a legally citizens, they do not know it. Many may not have support to adjust, find accommodation, or secure employment.

Directive 99 was much welcomed by New Zealand law enforcement, with arrivals subsequently reduced. These are now set to increase again with Directive 110. Prime Minister Chris Luxon responded to the news, stating “We regret the decision that Australia has made.” Bilateral tensions around criminal deportations appear to have again raised their ugly head.

But it is not just our closest ally that has borne the brunt of Australia’s deportation policy. Our so-called “Pacific Family” is also affected. Tonga, Samoa, Cook Islands, and Fiji have all spoken out about the effects of criminal deportations on their states and the wider region. Criminal deportations have been raised by the Pacific Islands Forum as a security threat in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security Action Plan, and the Regional Organised Crime Disruption Strategy. New Zealand and the US also deport to the Pacific Islands region.

There are very few avenues for support for deported people once they arrive in Pacific Island states, other than in Samoa. Deported people are seeking support, saying that having opportunities to fit in, find adequate accommodation and employment, and contribute to society, would very likely reduce the risk of re-offending.

But even though Australia’s development assistance to the Pacific Islands is high, and our concerns about security in the region are top of the priority list, there is no explicit support regarding the arrival of criminals from Australia. Even when Tongan non-governmental organisations requested tables and chairs for a halfway house to accommodate deported people, Australia refused to provide funding.

In a more serious incident, a person deported from Australia committed arson on their return to Cook Islands – creating an NZD$8 million insurance headache for the Cook Islands Government. Cook Islands subsequently called upon Australia to “take more responsibility and provide resourcing support towards Pacific Islands Countries where they are exporting criminal deportees.” Cook Islands only receives deportations from Australia, and yet Australia refuses to diplomatically engage on the issue.

At a time of heightened geopolitical competition in the Pacific Islands region, when Australia is seeking to maintain influence, winning hearts and minds matters. Australia has sought to ease some of the migration restrictions on Pacific Islanders amid this competition for influence. But the lack of engagement over deportation is undermining these efforts – and the oscillation over Directives 99 and 110 increasing deportations, is unlikely to improve the situation.

Henrietta McNeill is a Research Fellow in the Department of Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.