Amid regional upheaval, Turkey looks to energy to secure strategic autonomy

The growing uncertainty of an increasingly multipolar world has made it clear to many states that strategic autonomy is not a luxury but a necessity if they want to secure their future on their own terms. What is less clear is how to attain it. For many years, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan thought that making Turkey self-reliant meant going it alone. While pursuing what Turkish officials called “an assertive national foreign policy,” Ankara strained ties with Western allies and Middle Eastern partners, leaving Turkey too weak to realize its goals. Erdoğan now understands that the path to strategic autonomy requires building bridges with allies and foes alike, not burning them. One area where this newfound instinct for coalition-building will come in handy is the energy sector.

Turkey is one of the world’s leading energy consumers, but it is poor in natural resources. It depends on Russia and neighbors like Iraq and Iran to meet its energy needs, and this dependency creates vulnerabilities. To overcome them and strengthen Ankara’s hand, Erdoğan has sought to position Turkey as an energy hub, connecting natural gas producers to its east and south with markets to the west. Turkey’s geographical position and infrastructure give it an advantage in this regard, but occupying a beneficial location does not relieve Ankara from having to dust off its long-abandoned foreign policy approach: “zero problems with neighbors” and the West. Amid changing regional dynamics, Ankara sees an opportunity to achieve that and revive its plans to become an energy hub.

Turkey’s quest for strategic autonomy

Turkish policymakers have long sought to achieve an autonomous foreign policy. During the Arab uprisings in the 2010s, however, it became the guiding principle for the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) approach to the world. Turkey not only sought autonomy from the West but also greater influence in the region. It pursued a foreign policy that was muscular and unilateral. Turkey launched military incursions into Syria, sent military supplies and fighters to Libya, deployed its navy to the Eastern Mediterranean to assert Turkish regional claims, and expanded its military operations against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants in northern Iraq. By 2020, Turkey’s military footprint had become the most expansive since the days of the Ottoman Empire.

This new policy was a far cry from Turkey’s previous focus on diplomacy, trade, and cultural engagement in its foreign relations. It pitted Ankara against regional countries, Western allies, and Russia. Erdoğan’s spokesperson called Turkey’s isolation “precious loneliness,” but in reality it was a failed attempt at autonomy. The policies meant to make Turkey strong and independent ended up highlighting how dependent Ankara was on others to realize its goals.

One of the casualties of this approach was Erdoğan’s long-held dream of turning Turkey into an energy hub where energy resources are not only transited but also bought and sold by outside parties, creating mutual interdependencies with Western countries and regional states as well as reinforcing Turkey’s status as a regional power. But Ankara’s aggressive foreign policy got in the way and made its energy ambitions impossible to achieve.

Iraq — one of Turkey’s top oil suppliers, which additionally and boasts sizeable reserves of natural gas — is one example where Ankara’s policies strained bilateral ties. In 2013, Turkey started facilitating oil exports from Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) without Baghdad’s consent, in violation of a 1973 Iraq-Turkey pipeline agreement. Relations were already under stress because of Turkey’s cross-border military operations against the PKK headquarters in northern Iraq as well as competition for influence there with Iran. A year later, Iraq filed for arbitration with the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) over Turkey’s role. The ICC ruled in Iraq’s favor and determined that Turkey should pay $1.5 billion in compensation. In a fit of pique, Ankara chose to halt oil imports from Iraq in hope of forcing Baghdad to disavow the ruling and halt a second ICC case still in the works. Since then, the issue has gotten caught in the gears of both Iraq’s internal disputes between the Kurds and the central government, as well as the regional rivalries among Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The result has been a two-year hiatus in Iraqi oil flows through Turkey that has hurt everyone economically, but has benefited Baghdad and Tehran politically.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, another region critical to Turkey’s energy ambitions, Ankara’s foreign policy missteps also led to the formation of an anti-Turkey front. Turkey’s support for the Arab uprisings, particularly its alignment with Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, strained ties with regional powers like Egypt, which viewed the movements as threats to their regimes. Turkey’s subsequent unilateral military interventions in Syria, and later Libya, along with its assertive policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, further exacerbated tensions. Turkey’s maritime border agreements with Libya’s internationally recognized, Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) alarmed Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt, which saw them as a challenge to their own energy interests. These policies led to the emergence of an anti-Turkey coalition that included Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and, at times, France, all of which sought to counter Ankara’s influence and assert their own energy and security interests in the region.

These challenges highlighted that Turkey could only achieve true autonomy through collaboration rather than isolation and unilateral action. Ankara has already taken steps to mend ties with several countries but believes the current regional context offers a unique opportunity to build on those steps to turn the country into a regional energy hub. This would, one Turkish official told this author, “help us carve out an autonomous space not just from the West but also Russia.”

New regional balance of power

The fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in early December 2024 marked a significant shift in the balance of power in the Middle East. Israel’s strikes against Iran and its proxies following Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack had already diminished Iran’s influence, while Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 strained its resources and reduced its commitments to Syria. Assad’s toppling dealt a further blow to Tehran and Moscow.

Moves by the US will also have significant implications for the regional power balance, including the announced end of the coalition mission in Iraq in September 2025 and the likely withdrawal of troops from Syria. These developments suggest a new power dynamic is taking shape in the Middle East, with a diminished Russian, Iranian, and US role. Ankara sees this as an opportunity to realize its strategic goals, including in the energy sector.

A weakened Iran and the impending US withdrawal have already shifted dynamics in Iraq in Turkey’s favor. Several disagreements had hindered efforts to resume energy cooperation between Ankara and Baghdad. Iraqi Kurdistan has rich energy resources but the competition between the Turkey-backed Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Iran-backed Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) as well as disagreements with the central government have derailed progress. Opposition from Iran, Iraq’s biggest supplier of natural gas and Ankara’s rival, complicated things further.

Water supply issues and the PKK’s presence in northern Iraq have also loomed large in bilateral relations. Iraq faces water scarcity and has been asking for a greater share from Turkey, from which the Tigris and Euphrates rivers that provide the primary source of water for large parts of Iraq flow. For its part, Turkey has been asking Iraq to designate the PKK as a “terrorist organization” and do more to curb its activities. A series of recent announcements indicate Turkey and Iraq have made significant progress on these fronts. Iraqi officials said Baghdad is waiting for Turkish approval to restart crude oil exports from the semi-autonomous KRG to Turkey after an almost two-year delay. The two countries also reached a landmark agreement on water sharing, in which Turkey said it will release more water to Iraq while Iraq promised to label the PKK as a “banned organization” and pledged closer cooperation in the fight against the group. These announcements come amidst efforts to unify the military forces of the KDP and the PUK in northern Iraq, which have complicated Turkey’s Iraq policy. Helping Ankara’s plans is Turkey’s own negotiations with the PKK. The militant group’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, recently called on his fighters to lay down their arms.

Turkey hopes to capitalize on shifting regional dynamics to reap benefits in the Eastern Mediterranean for its energy policy. It is poised to play a key role in Syria following the toppling of the Assad regime by a group close to Ankara. In late December, the Turkish transport minister announced that Turkey will sign an agreement with Syria to establish an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This is a significant step to reverse Assad-era policies that undermined Turkey’s energy interests by rejecting Ankara’s EEZ claims and aligning with the region’s anti-Turkey bloc. Prior to Assad’s ejection, Damascus granted Moscow access to offshore energy exploration rights in its territorial waters, complicating matters for Ankara. By signing an EEZ agreement with Syria’s new rulers, Turkey hopes to expand its maritime jurisdiction for hydrocarbon exploration, a move that could give it access to untapped natural gas and oil reserves in the region.

Ankara also wants to build new oil and gas pipelines linking Syria to Turkey’s export terminals. The Turkish energy minister expressed optimism that Assad’s fall would revive the long-frozen pipeline project connecting Turkey and Qatar via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. Turkey pushed for the project to reduce its reliance on Russian gas and further its ambitions of becoming an energy hub, but Assad rejected it due to Russian opposition.

Ankara’s recent moves could position it as a key player in European efforts to reduce dependency on Russian energy and offer a technically and financially attractive option to regional countries to export their energy to Europe. Russia has opposed such efforts, but Ankara thinks Moscow does not have many options other than to support its energy hub plans — as the West strengthened its sanctions on Russian energy exports, Turkey has continued to offer Russia an alternative supply route to Europe. Turkey is also exploiting legal loopholes that allow blended Russian oil products to enter the EU. From February 2023 to February 2024, Turkey sold 5.16 million tons of Russian oil products to European entities. Turkey could address European opposition to purchasing Russian gas by using it for domestic consumption and only selling gas from other suppliers to Europe. “With our plan, everybody wins,” one Turkish official told this author.

Developments in Syria have buoyed Turkey’s newfound confidence vis-à-vis Russia. Ankara still depends on Moscow for its energy needs, but Assad’s fall has changed the balance of power in Turkey’s favor. Ankara also relied on Russian acquiescence to launch military operations against the PKK-linked Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), forcing Ankara to tread carefully so as not to alienate Moscow. A 2020 incident in which Russian-backed forces killed 33 Turkish soldiers near Idlib in northern Syria is a case in point. Despite domestic uproar, President Erdoğan put the blame entirely on the Assad regime without mentioning Moscow’s role. With a new, Ankara-friendly government in Damascus, the tables have turned. Russia wants to retain its military presence in Syria, but it is not certain whether Damascus will agree. In response, Russia has relocated air-defense systems and other advanced weapons from Syria to bases it controls in Libya, where Turkey plays an outsized role.

Turkey is the main foreign backer of Libya’s GNA. To prop up its ally and secure its energy interests in the region, Turkey sent military personnel and equipment to the North African country, helping to turn the tide of the war in early 2020 and stabilize the situation on the ground. Given Turkey’s naval advantages and military position, Russia needs Turkey’s goodwill to maintain its naval presence in the Mediterranean, giving Ankara leverage over Moscow.

To capitalize on a weakened Russia and Iran, Turkey recently took another step to further its energy ambitions. It has long sought to bring Turkmen gas to Europe via its territory, but Russian and Iranian objections derailed the plan. In mid-February, Turkey and Turkmenistan finally signed a landmark agreement to begin the flow of Turkmen gas, which will be transported via Iran’s existing natural gas framework, something Tehran had previously opposed. To Russia’s dismay, Turkey is also working on a separate project to build a gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and then on to Turkey.

All stars aligned?

Becoming a regional energy hub has long been a key part of Turkey’s quest for strategic autonomy, an ambitious goal for a country with very limited hydrocarbon resources. Ankara’s unilateral and militaristic foreign policy has further complicated an already difficult project. But Ankara thinks that the stars have finally aligned. President Erdoğan has come to understand that for Turkey to stand on its own two feet, it needs to work with friends and foes alike. The current international and regional context provides opportunities for it to do just that. With Turkey’s accession to the European Union frozen, Turkish-EU relations have been on a downward spiral for over a decade. But the Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted energy as a key area for cooperation, benefiting both sides. Europe wants non-Russian gas, and Ankara is one of the few partners that can give Brussels that. The fall of Assad strengthens Ankara’s hand vis-à-vis Moscow, which allows Turkey to pursue policies that Russia had opposed in the past. A weakened Iran also provides a tailwind for Turkey’s energy ambitions. And finally, as they work to resolve bilateral issues, Turkey and Iraq have made great progress in cultivating closer energy ties.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House reinforces Ankara’s belief that now is the time to strengthen ties across the board. Turkish-American relations have been strained over a host of issues, key among them the US cooperation with the Syrian Kurdish militia in the fight against ISIS. Ankara considers the militia a terrorist organization and has long asked Washington to stop arming and training the group. Washington, for its part, has been frustrated with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally’s decision to purchase the Russian S-400 missile-defense system. In response, the US kicked Turkey out of the F-35 fighter jet program and slapped sanctions on Turkey. Adding to the tension was Ankara’s refusal to join the Western-imposed sanctions on Moscow after Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Turkey’s assistance with Russia’s sanctions evasion.

Efforts to resolve these issues failed in the past, but Ankara thinks a resolution to several key problems is possible under Trump. The potential withdrawal of US troops from Syria, which Turkish officials think is likely with the new US administration, will remove a major irritant between the two countries. Ankara is hopeful that even the S-400 question can be addressed because Turkish officials now see a more willing partner in the White House and Congress to resume a defense partnership. A new page in bilateral ties, officials in Ankara think, will help further Turkey’s energy ambitions as well. While the previous American administration sought to punish Russia and Turkey for its relations with Moscow, the Trump administration appears to be seeking a grand rapprochement with Russian President Vladimir Putin, including improved economic ties more broadly as well as in the energy sector specifically, which Ankara thinks will help its efforts to become an energy hub.

Challenges remain

Turkey’s energy plans still face plenty of challenges. A decades-old conflict between Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece, rooted in the 1974 Cypriot coup and subsequent Turkish military intervention, is hampering efforts to explore and extract natural gas from the Mediterranean. Turkey’s ties with Israel, another key player in Eastern Mediterranean energy, remain strained. To realize its energy hub goals, Turkey had mended ties with Israel, but fallout from the latter’s devastating military campaign in Gaza soured relations. Adding to these challenges is the reluctance of some European countries to depend on Turkey for energy. Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule and past foreign policy missteps have made European leaders wary of working with Ankara. There are also questions about the viability of cooperation on natural gas at a time when Europe is trying to transition to green energy. Another wild card is President Trump’s Russia and Iran policies. When President Joe Biden's administration imposed sanctions on Russia’s Gazprombank, which handles payments for natural gas from Gazprom’s customers, Turkey received exemptions. When Trump re-introduced sanctions against Iranian oil exports in 2018, he also gave Turkey waivers. Speaking earlier in February, Trump said he aims to drive “Iran’s oil exports to zero.” He may not grant Turkey exemptions this time.

Despite those challenges, Turkish officials think they have no option but to become an energy hub. They think that, amid the struggle between countries for power and influence in today’s uncertain world, energy is as critical as economic and military might. Ankara is determined to capitalize on its assets to position itself as a key energy player and the current regional context just might enable it to do that.

 

Gönül Tol is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute.

Photo by TUR Presidency/Murat Kula /Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images