Caught in the crossfire: How the Iran-Israel war undermines Erdoğan’s agenda

After Israel assassinated Lebanese Hizballah commander Hassan Nasrallah toward the end of last year, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s message of solidarity with Lebanon conspicuously omitted the former militant group leader’s name. Turkey watchers in Washington noticed. Indeed, that carefully worded response signaled Ankara’s quiet relief at the weakening of Iran’s proxies, which have long undermined Turkey’s own influence across the region. A diminished Iran could open space for Turkish maneuvering from Iraq to Syria to Lebanon. But Israel’s full-blown war against Iran is a different matter entirely — one that threatens to upend regional dynamics and Turkey’s careful balancing act — hence, the growing unease in Ankara. Amid the escalating Israel-Iran war, Erdoğan placed three calls within 48 hours to his counterpart in the United States, Donald Trump, urging the US president to help halt the fighting. That urgency is justified: the conflict presents both immediate threats and long-term strategic risks for Turkey.

Economic shocks

The most immediate casualty of the Israel-Iran war may be Erdoğan’s economic agenda. Surging global oil prices are compounding the vulnerabilities of Turkey’s already fragile economy, threatening to blow past inflation targets and widen the current account deficit.

With Turkey importing most of its oil and natural gas from abroad, the spike in crude has put additional strain on Ankara’s external balances. Even at a slightly cooled price of $74.20 per barrel, the cost remains high enough to disrupt Turkey’s economic stabilization plan. Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz — a key route for Turkish imports from Iraq, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia — raise the stakes further. Officials downplay the risk, and analysts say such a move would be economic suicide for Tehran. Still, in a conflict this volatile, even low-probability risks carry weight.

The war is also putting Turkey’s energy security at risk more directly — with predictable economic consequences. Iran supplies 16% of Turkey’s annual gas needs, much of it produced from the South Pars offshore field. The processing facility was struck by Israeli airstrikes on Saturday. Production was partially halted, and further damage could cripple the site for an extended period. With sanctions limiting Iran’s ability to make repairs, any prolonged disruption would leave Turkey exposed to gas supply shortages or price spikes.

This economic shock arrives at a precarious moment. After hiking interest rates to contain inflation, the Turkish central bank is under rising pressure from business groups to ease monetary policy. But with energy prices surging and investor confidence on edge, loosening too soon could backfire, which would leave Erdoğan’s economic program caught between geopolitical fallout and domestic frustration.

Fears of new refugee flows and militant infiltration

The war presents additional challenges for Turkey, particularly on its eastern border. The country has hosted nearly 4 million Syrian refugees for more than a decade now, which has fueled growing public resentment over time and, in turn, eroded support for Erdoğan’s ruling party. Ankara also shares a long and porous frontier with Iran — a route long viewed as a security risk due to illegal crossings and suspected infiltration by militants linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) based in camps on the Iranian side. To address these concerns, Turkey began building a security wall along its border in 2017. Construction accelerated in 2021, after the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan, when 300,000 Afghans entered the country and Erdoğan vowed to block further arrivals.

Now, with Israeli strikes on Iran prompting renewed instability, reports of Iranian civilians crossing into Turkey have resurfaced. While the government downplays the possibility of a new refugee wave, opposition media outlets are raising the alarm. In response, Ankara has tightened security along the Iranian border to prevent further inflows and possible militant infiltration.

Turkey has long viewed Iran’s tolerance of PKK-linked groups as a threat, but the ongoing Israel-Iran war has amplified those concerns at a politically sensitive time for Erdoğan and his nationalist allies. Ankara recently launched peace talks with the PKK at home, culminating in the group’s surprise decision to disarm and disband — a move Erdoğan hopes will win the support of the pro-Kurdish party in parliament to pave the way for extending his rule beyond 2028.

The regional fallout from the Israel-Iran war, however, risks derailing that plan. Ankara fears the conflict could reenergize the PKK’s Iranian wing, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (in Kurdish, Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê or PJAK), which has remained largely inactive since declaring a cease-fire in 2011. That fear is not unfounded: the last round of Turkish-PKK talks in 2013, coupled with the Syrian civil war, significantly strengthened PJAK’s political and organizational reach. Now, PJAK has seized on the current chaos, calling on its fighters to launch a new phase of the “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” (“Woman, Life, Freedom”) revolution and signaling its readiness to take action — deepening Ankara’s unease just as Erdoğan tries to broker domestic peace.

Foreign policy upset

The war also threatens to upend Erdoğan’s carefully recalibrated foreign policy. After the Arab uprisings, Ankara’s assertive, regime-change-driven agenda left Turkey isolated, alienating Gulf states, straining ties with Washington, and contributing to the Syrian refugee crisis that eroded Erdoğan’s domestic support. In response, Ankara shifted gears, mending ties with regional rivals, including Israel, and re-engaging with the US. The new foreign policy prioritized trade, investment, and energy cooperation, aligning with the Gulf’s own turn toward pragmatism and regional stability.

This shared vision was bolstered by President Trump’s transactional approach, which Turkey saw as a chance to reset relations with Washington. But the Israel-Iran war now threatens to derail that momentum. Of particular concern to Ankara is the possibility of direct US military involvement, which could not only sabotage its diplomatic reset with Washington but also draw Turkey into Iran’s crosshairs as a potential target for retaliation — especially given its role as a host to a key North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) early-warning system, the radar base in Kürecik. Turkish officials deny claims that the Kürecik facility helped with intercepting Iranian drones and missiles during Tehran’s recent attacks on Israel, insisting that any data gathered is shared strictly within NATO channels and only with member states. But the issue is gaining traction. Both the Iranian government and Turkey’s domestic opposition are amplifying concerns that Kürecik is aiding Israel’s defense and enabling preemptive strikes by shielding it from retaliation.

Since Ankara agreed to host the radar in 2011, Iran has repeatedly condemned the move, accusing Turkey’s government of capitulating to Western — and, by extension, Israeli — interests. Iranian military leaders — including former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh, who was killed in Israeli airstrikes on June 13 — have long warned that Kürecik would be among the first targets in the event of a conflict. Turkish opposition parties echo these fears, accusing the government of exposing Turkey to unnecessary risk for the sake of foreign alliances.

With the Israel-Iran war escalating and public anger toward Israel growing in Turkey, calls to shut down the radar have resurfaced. The stakes are high: continued operation of Kürecik could not only deepen domestic backlash but also increase the likelihood of Iran viewing Turkey as a legitimate military target — especially if the US joins the war.

Beyond the immediate risks, the escalating conflict presents Turkey with a deeper strategic challenge. Israeli officials have signaled that their strikes aim not just to cripple Iran’s nuclear program but to weaken, if not topple, the regime itself. Yet with no viable opposition ready to step in, regime collapse could leave Iran teetering toward state failure, adding yet another fragile neighbor to Turkey’s already unstable southern border. Turkey is already grappling with the consequences of chaos in Syria and Iraq, which have brought waves of refugees, cross-border threats, and economic strain. A destabilized Iran would magnify these problems just as Erdoğan faces mounting domestic pressures ahead of the 2028 elections.

An uncertain, fast-approaching future

With Erdogan struggling to contain Turkey’s growing domestic crises and leaning heavily on foreign policy wins to shore up support, Ankara is desperate for the Israel-Iran war to end — and for the US to stay out of it. Turkey has tried to position itself as a mediator, but neither the Iranian nor Israeli leaderships see Ankara as credible or neutral enough to play that role effectively. For Erdoğan, the best hope lies with Trump stepping in to de-escalate the conflict. But with the American president continuing to post erratic, often contradictory messages online, Turkish officials remain on edge, uncertain about what comes next.

 

Gönül Tol is Senior Fellow at MEI and the author of Erdogan’s War: A Strongman’s Struggle at Home and in Syria.

Photo by Mustafa Istemi/ dia images via Getty Images